HTTPS request enrichment

ABSTRACT

This disclosure provides for a network element (in the middle) to inject enrichments into SSL connections, and for taking them out. This network element is sometimes referred to herein as a “middle box.” In the context of layered software architecture, this solution preferably is implemented by a library that operates below the SSL layer and above the TCP sockets layer at the two endpoints of the SSL connection. Preferably, the SSL enrichments are implemented as SSL/TLS records.

BACKGROUND Technical Field

This application relates generally to secure network-basedcommunications using cryptographic protocols.

Brief Description of the Related Art

Distributed computer systems are well-known in the prior art. One suchdistributed computer system is a “content delivery network” (CDN) or“overlay network” that is operated and managed by a service provider.The service provider typically provides the content delivery service onbehalf of third parties (customers) who use the service provider'sshared infrastructure. A distributed system of this type typicallyrefers to a collection of autonomous computers linked by a network ornetworks, together with the software, systems, protocols and techniquesdesigned to facilitate various services, such as content delivery, webapplication acceleration, or other support of outsourced origin siteinfrastructure. A CDN service provider typically provides servicedelivery through digital properties (such as a website), which areprovisioned in a customer portal and then deployed to the network. Adigital property typically is bound to one or more edge configurationsthat allow the service provider to account for traffic and bill itscustomer.

Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer(SSL), are cryptographic protocols that provide Internet communicationsecurity. They use asymmetric cryptography for authentication and keyexchange, symmetric encryption for confidentiality, and messageauthentication codes for message integrity. TLS/SSL is initialized at asession layer then works at a presentation layer. In particular, firstthe session layer has a handshake using an asymmetric cipher toestablish cipher settings and a shared key for that session. Thereafter,a presentation layer encrypts the rest of the communication using asymmetric cipher and that session key. In both models, TLS and SSL workon behalf of the underlying transport layer, whose segments carryencrypted data. TLS is an IETF standards track protocol, defined in RFC5246 and RFC 6176.

HTTP request enrichment is a useful and low-overhead technique used byInternet Service Providers (ISPs) to pass on client intelligence to HTTPservers. This is usually achieved with the help of a Deep PacketInspection (DPI) box capable of identifying HTTP requests, interjectingtext into them, and offsetting the TCP flow's sequence numbers correctlybetween client and server. This functionality, however, cannot exist forHTTPS requests because a middle box is incapable of inserting anythinginto an SSL flow.

As additional background, many mobile network operators use transparentproxies and online transcoding or transrating devices to shape trafficin high traffic hours, e.g., based on real-time conditions in theirnetwork. These methods are very useful to the operators, but they arebecoming increasingly irrelevant due to the growing volume of SSLstreaming.

BRIEF SUMMARY

A method for HTTPS request enrichment is described. In one embodiment,the method uses a special form of enrichment record, and it takesadvantage of a software layer between TCP and SSL/TLS that handles theenrichment records and an application programming interface (API) ofthis layer that the SSL/TLS layer and the application layer can use. Thetechniques herein also provide for discovery of enrichment capabilityand key negotiation for the secure communication of enrichments.

The foregoing has outlined some of the more pertinent features of thedisclosed subject matter. These features should be construed to bemerely illustrative. Many other beneficial results can be attained byapplying the disclosed subject matter in a different manner or bymodifying the subject matter as will be described.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

For a more complete understanding of the subject matter and theadvantages thereof, reference is now made to the following descriptionstaken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which:

FIG. 1 depicts an overlay network, such as a content delivery network(CDN), in which the techniques of this disclosure may be practiced;

FIG. 2 depicts an architecture of an edge server of the overlay network;

FIG. 3 depicts a standard record format for an SSL/TLS record;

FIG. 4 depicts a conventional exchange of SSL records between a clientand a server;

FIG. 5 depicts a representative implementation for the requestenrichment technique of this disclosure;

FIG. 6 shows various functions that may be implemented by the enrichmentlayer in FIG. 5;

FIG. 7 depicts how an SSL request enrichment is incorporated into themessage flow in one embodiment;

FIG. 8 depicts how an SSL request enrichment is incorporated into themessage flow in another embodiment;

FIG. 9 depicts a preferred software layering approach for implementingan enrichment layer functionality;

FIG. 10 depicts how SSL enrichment may be used in a mobile networkingenvironment according to this disclosure;

FIG. 11 illustrates how a service discovery protocol may be used todiscuss service APIs, and to negotiate encryption keys, in the mobilenetworking environment; and

FIG. 12 depicts an alternative approach for insertion of enrichmentusing an SSL record wrapping protocol.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

FIG. 1 illustrates a known distributed computer system that (asdescribed below) is extended by the techniques herein to provide asingle HTTP-based platform with the ability to deliver online HD videoat broadcast audience scale to the most popular runtime environments andto the latest devices in both fixed line and mobile environments.

In a known system, such as shown in FIG. 1, a distributed computersystem 100 is configured as a CDN and is assumed to have a set ofmachines 102a-n distributed around the Internet. Typically, most of themachines are servers located near the edge of the Internet, i.e., at oradjacent end user access networks. A network operations command center(NOCC) 104 manages operations of the various machines in the system.Third party sites, such as web site 106, offload delivery of content(e.g., HTML, embedded page objects, streaming media, software downloads,and the like) to the distributed computer system 100 and, in particular,to “edge” servers. Typically, content providers offload their contentdelivery by aliasing (e.g., by a DNS CNAME) given content providerdomains or sub-domains to domains that are managed by the serviceprovider's authoritative domain name service. End users that desire thecontent are directed to the distributed computer system to obtain thatcontent more reliably and efficiently. Although not shown in detail, thedistributed computer system may also include other infrastructure, suchas a distributed data collection system 108 that collects usage andother data from the edge servers, aggregates that data across a regionor set of regions, and passes that data to other back-end systems 110,112, 114 and 116 to facilitate monitoring, logging, alerts, billing,management and other operational and administrative functions.Distributed network agents 118 monitor the network as well as the serverloads and provide network, traffic and load data to a DNS query handlingmechanism 115, which is authoritative for content domains being managedby the CDN. A distributed data transport mechanism 120 may be used todistribute control information (e.g., metadata to manage content, tofacilitate load balancing, and the like) to the edge servers.

As illustrated in FIG. 2, a given machine 200 comprises commodityhardware (e.g., an Intel Pentium processor) 202 running an operatingsystem kernel (such as Linux or variant) 204 that supports one or moreapplications 206 a-n. To facilitate content delivery services, forexample, given machines typically run a set of applications, such as anHTTP proxy 207 (sometimes referred to as a “global host” or “ghost”process), a name server 208, a local monitoring process 210, adistributed data collection process 212, and the like. For streamingmedia, the machine typically includes one or more media servers, such asa Windows Media Server (WMS) or Flash server, as required by thesupported media formats.

A CDN edge server is configured to provide one or more extended contentdelivery features, preferably on a domain-specific, customer-specificbasis, preferably using configuration files that are distributed to theedge servers using a configuration system. A given configuration filepreferably is XML-based and includes a set of content handling rules anddirectives that facilitate one or more advanced content handlingfeatures. The configuration file may be delivered to the CDN edge servervia the data transport mechanism. U.S. Pat. No. 7,111,057 illustrates auseful infrastructure for delivering and managing edge server contentcontrol information, and this and other edge server control informationcan be provisioned by the CDN service provider itself, or (via anextranet or the like) the content provider customer who operates theorigin server.

The CDN may include a storage subsystem, such as described in U.S. Pat.No. 7,472,178, the disclosure of which is incorporated herein byreference.

The CDN may operate a server cache hierarchy to provide intermediatecaching of customer content; one such cache hierarchy subsystem isdescribed in U.S. Pat. No. 7,376,716, the disclosure of which isincorporated herein by reference.

The CDN may provide secure content delivery among a client browser, edgeserver and customer origin server in the manner described in U.S.Publication No. 20040093419. Secure content delivery as describedtherein enforces SSL-based links between the client and the edge serverprocess, on the one hand, and between the edge server process and anorigin server process, on the other hand. This enables an SSL-protectedweb page and/or components thereof to be delivered via the edge server.

As an overlay, the CDN resources may be used to facilitate wide areanetwork (WAN) acceleration services between enterprise data centers(which may be privately-managed) and third party software-as-a-service(SaaS) providers.

In a typical operation, a content provider identifies a content providerdomain or sub-domain that it desires to have served by the CDN. The CDNservice provider associates (e.g., via a canonical name, or CNAME) thecontent provider domain with an edge network (CDN) hostname, and the CDNprovider then provides that edge network hostname to the contentprovider. When a DNS query to the content provider domain or sub-domainis received at the content provider's domain name servers, those serversrespond by returning the edge network hostname. The edge networkhostname points to the CDN, and that edge network hostname is thenresolved through the CDN name service. To that end, the CDN name servicereturns one or more IP addresses. The requesting client browser thenmakes a content request (e.g., via HTTP or HTTPS) to an edge serverassociated with the IP address. The request includes a host header thatincludes the original content provider domain or sub-domain. Uponreceipt of the request with the host header, the edge server checks itsconfiguration file to determine whether the content domain or sub-domainrequested is actually being handled by the CDN. If so, the edge serverapplies its content handling rules and directives for that domain orsub-domain as specified in the configuration. These content handlingrules and directives may be located within an XML-based “metadata”configuration file.

By way of additional background, it is known in the prior art to provideso-called HTTP request enrichment. The following provides details ofthis technique. First, consider the flow of an HTTP (non-SSL)request/response through a network connecting a client and a server.Theoretically, such a flow may be intercepted by network elements in themiddle, such as transparent proxies, gateways, layer-7 switches, and thelike. The network elements may choose to autonomously insert extraheaders into the HTTP request to communicate addition auxiliaryinformation about the request to the server. This is the process of HTTPrequest enrichment. In addition, the server may add additional auxiliaryinformation about the response into some headers, which the networkelement in the middle may then read and extract from the responseheaders before sending it to the client. This HTTP request enrichment isavailable as a simple feature in many commercially-available networkelements. For example, Juniper Networks mobile networks gateway includesa feature to enrich every HTTP request coming from a mobile device withthe MSISDN number of the device, so that the server can identify theuser.

HTTP is a text-based protocol, and it does not attempt to preserve theauthenticity of request/response headers through mechanisms such ascheck-summing or the like. HTTP header enrichment works in this(non-HTTPS-based) environment because the network elements are able tosee the request and response structure in the data flow on the wire, andfurther because insertion/extraction of information does not break anysecurity mechanisms.

HTTPS Request Enrichment

HTTPS is a protocol that uses encryption for communication. SSL/TLS arethe basic techniques. The encryption techniques make it impossible for aman-in-the-middle observer to know the encryption keys. In thisenvironment, the network elements in the middle can neither decipher theencrypted communication, nor can they insert any data into the encryptedflow. The network elements in the middle therefore cannot enrich HTTPSrequests in a manner similar to HTTP.

One alternative to communicating enrichment information, e.g., betweenthe server and a network element in the middle of a client-server flow,is to use an “out-of-band” method. In this approach, the network elementmay send enrichment information about an ongoing HTTPS connection to thewebserver on a separate connection. As a concrete example, if a mobiledevice at IP address ip1 connects to a server at IP address ip2, thenenrichment of the above example could be implemented through a separateHTTPS request from the network element to the server, which sends theserver at ip2 a pair <ip1, some data>. The server may then be requiredto apply the enrichment information to the right client requests, e.g.,by checking the client's ip/port against all enrichments received. Whilethis approach works in certain network environments, this type ofsolution fails to function in the presence of Network AddressTranslation (NAT) devices between the network entity and the server. Inthis scenario, the client's IP address may be seen as ip1 (the pre-NATaddress) by the network entity and as ip3 by the server (the post-NATaddress). To successfully enrich requests in the presence of NAT, eitherthe network entity or the server must have a way to do translationbetween the two ip addresses of the same client in real time. The NATproblem is almost always encountered when a network element is inside amobile element and the server is on the public internet. In particular,the NAT mechanism used by mobile gateways often has no real-time API for(in this example ip1↔ip3) translations, which makes enrichment of HTTPSrequests difficult.

The subject matter of this disclosure addresses this problem, as is nowdescribed.

The technique provides for an SSL enrichment mechanism for HTTPSrequests.

This approach enables a network element (in the middle) to injectenrichments into SSL connections, and for taking them out. This networkelement is sometimes referred to herein as a “middle box.” In thecontext of layered software architecture, this solution preferably isimplemented by a library that operates below the SSL layer and above theTCP sockets layer at the two endpoints of the SSL connection. Thisimplementation, however, is not intended to be limiting.

As will be seen, this approach has several attractive properties. Inparticular, because enrichments are injected into the data flow of anSSL connection, the method is immune to the NAT problem. Injectingenrichments into the data flow in this manner also is more efficientthan the out-of-band enrichments method. Because in the preferredembodiment the library preferably is below the SSL layer, theimplementation does not require any changes to the SSL layer (e.g., anOpenSSL package). Rather, in effect the library is a man-in-the-middle(MITM) entity as far as the SSL protocol goes. In this position in theprotocol stack, the enrichment layer has the same vantage point as thatof other entities in the middle, such as WiFi devices, firewalls,switches, routers, DPI boxes and the like. The enrichment layer, likeany of these entities, neither is able to get access to the session keysof the SSL connection, nor influence the mechanism used to negotiatethem. Its ignorance of the session key prevents the layer fromdeciphering the contents of encrypted communications and/or writingcorrectly-encrypted data into the connection on behalf of the eitherendpoint. In addition, the layer does not need the SSL certificate forits operation at the connection's endpoints, or in the network elementsin the middle. By virtue of the above properties, this method is easilyproved to introduce no security risks.

The enrichment method is now further explained below in detail.

By way of background, to establish an SSL connection with the server,the client first establishes a TCP connection to the server; it thenproceeds with the SSL handshake, in which messages of various types suchas client-hello, server-hello, certificate, etc. are sent and received.At the end of the handshake, the session (master) key is established andthe encrypted payload starts to flow through the SSL connection in bothdirections. The messages, as well as the encrypted payload, areorganized in the form of SSL/TLS records. The record format isstandardized, and it is shown by record 300 in FIG. 3. This recordformat comprises a Content Type (or Type) field, a Major Version field,a Minor Version field, a Compressed Length field, the Plaintext, and aMessage Address Code (MAC) field. The Plaintext and the MAC fields maybe encrypted. As is known, the exchange of records 400 between a client402 and a server 404 typically proceeds as illustrated in FIG. 4.

There is no strict requirement on the content and the format ofenrichment data for the scheme of this disclosure to work. At a verybasic level, the scheme only requires that the injected data does notchange the original content of the SSL records, and that the twoendpoints must be able to distinguish between the original records andinjected enrichment data. To simply the design, preferably theenrichment data is inserted into the connection (in either direction)between two SSL/TLS records as opposed to being inserted directly intothe body of any original record. Also, preferably enrichment data isrepresented as an SSL/TLS record. Accordingly, the enrichment data issometimes termed an enrichment record.

For the identification of enrichment data, preferably the values chosenfor <type, major version, minor version> of the enrichment record arenot necessarily legal values for the connection, e.g., the first byte ofeach record specifies the record type. For SSLv3, only the values in therange of 20-24 are valid values for record type. According to theapproach herein, any unused number can be claimed (and thus used) forthe type of the enrichment record. In one example embodiment(non-limiting), −1 is used as the type of enrichment record. Because theenrichment record is an illegal record for the standard SSL/TLSprotocol, any SSL connection would be terminated if the SSL library seesthis record on the connection. That said, because the enrichment librarypreferably operates below the SSL layer, it is the library'sresponsibility not to pass along an enrichment record to the SSL layerabove it.

In a representative embodiment, as depicted in FIG. 5, the softwarelayers on the server side typically comprise (from bottom up) TCP 500, aTCP socket layer 502, the enrichment layer 504 of this disclosure, anSSL layer 506 (e.g., OpenSSL), and the application layer 508. FIG. 6shows various functions 600 that the enrichment layer 504 provides tothe application layer 508 to send/retrieve enrichments. The functionsshown in FIG. 6 are representative, and various operations may becombined. As far as the application layer is concerned, it simply callsone or more of the functions shown in FIG. 6 to get enrichments from theSSL connection, to send them on that connection, or the like.

The following provides additional details of a representative enrichmentlayer 504 according to this approach.

As is well-known, the SSL layer 506 uses TCP sockets layer 502 fornetwork communication. It particular, the SSL layer 506 uses standardsystem calls, such as open ( ) close ( ) read ( ) write ( ) listen ( )and accept ( ) with sockets. According to this disclosure, theenrichment layer 504 intercepts the calls between the SSL library 506and the sockets layer 502, preferably by using a system call wrappingmechanism. In particular, the system calls preferably are wrapped by theenrichment layer 504 so that, when the SSL layer 506 makes one of thesesystem calls, the corresponding (wrapper) function of the enrichmentlayer gets called. The wrapper function can then invoke the originalsystem call, in addition to performing additional actions.

Thus, for example, when the SSL layer calls read ( ) to receive datafrom the network, the enrichment layer's read wrapper gets called. Thisfunction, in turn, invokes the original system call read ( ) function toreceive data from the network. The data is then examined for SSL recordstructures, and any enrichment records found in it are taken out; theenrichment data from these records preferably is stored in a memorytable for incoming enrichments, corresponding to the socket from whichthey were read. The remaining data is then passed on to the SSL layer aspart of the read ( ) call.

When the application calls other API functions of FIG. 6, such as a getSSL enrichment count (getsslenrichmentcount ( )), a read SSL enrichmentsize (readsslenrichmentsize ( )), a read SSL enrichment(readsslenrichment ( )), etc., the enrichment layer answers the callsusing the table that stores these enrichments for each socket.

When the application layer calls a write SSL enrichment function(writesslenrichment( )), preferably the result is stored into anothertable that stores outgoing enrichments per socket. When the SSL layermakes a write ( ) call on the socket, the enrichment layer's writewrapper gets called. This function, in turn, invokes the original systemcall write ( ) to send data to the network. After the boundary of anySSL record written into the socket, an enrichment frame is constructedout of the outgoing enrichment data in the table for the given socketand written into the socket.

Preferably, the wrappers for system calls accept ( ) and close ( )perform housekeeping tasks.

The following describes the role of the network element located in themiddle (preferably a mobile networking element) and, in particular, howSSL enrichments can be used in to enrich an SSL request. In thisexample, the enrichment is a real-time bandwidth guidance for the enduser's device. This is just a representative example and is not intendedto limit the type of enrichment that may be implemented using thisscheme. In this example scenario, and with reference to FIG. 7, thenetwork element 700 in the middle functions as a transparent TCP proxybetween client 702 and server 704. The mobile network's administratorcan configure network routing to send all the user's packets destined tothe server's listening port (443) to the TCP proxy. Typically, the proxy700 terminates the TCP connection, although this is not a requirement.Logically, and as noted above, the proxy is not an SSL endpoint; rather,it is a man-in-the-middle for the SSL connection. It identifies theserver IP address and makes a separate connection to the server IPaddress on the SSL port. As such, the proxy 700 acts as a forwarder ofdata in both directions between the pair of connections. This proxy alsolinks the enrichment library for the request enrichment operation. Tothis end, at any point in time during the life of the connection pair,the proxy can call the writesslenrichment ( ) API function to insert itsknowledge of the client's bandwidth guidance into the SSL connection tothe server 704. This is illustrated in FIG. 7, which shows the flow ofSSL records for the above scenario. In this example, the enrichmentrecord 705 is immediately after the first SSL record from the client702, i.e., the client-hello record. Enrichments 805 could also be sentin the reverse direction, i.e. from the server 804 to the networkelement 800 in the middle and then on to the client 802, should there bea need for such communication. FIG. 8 illustrates this option.

Of course, there may be multiple network elements in the path of the SSLconnection that could each insert, extract or read-and-forward theenrichments.

Because the record type of an enrichment record is not necessarily alegal SSL/TLS record type, enrichment records should not be sent by anysender unless it is convinced that the receiver and all the networkelements in the middle are able to process them without error.Discovering whether the path and destination is “enrichment-capable”preferably requires a separate method. A simple way to implement thisfunctionality is through device configuration. The network element couldsimply take a list of servers that accept enrichments as itsconfiguration. In single-administrator environments, this type of methodis effective. When multiple administrative domains are involved incommunication, however, then a more automatic discovery mechanism iswarranted. The following discovery protocol may be used in such ascenario.

In particular, preferably the network element observes the trafficpassing through it to all the server IP addresses to which clients areforming connections. The network element then initiates a discoveryconnection to each of them. As part of the discovery connection, thenetwork element initiates an SSL handshake and inserts an enrichmentrecord into it before the handshake is complete. This enrichment recordidentifies the sender, and it requests that the receiving entity (orentities) identify themselves. When the destination server or a networkelement in the middle does not have the enrichment layer, their SSLlayer sees the enrichment record, which causes it to terminate theconnection with an error. The network element thus knows that either theserver or the path to it is not ready for enrichments. When everynetwork element on the path and the destination server are able toprocess the enrichment record, then they respond by adding an enrichmentrecord identifying themselves into the SSL connection towards thesender. If the SSL handshake with a server completes successfully, thenthe network element can conclude that the path to the server and theserver itself are enrichment-capable. The network element also canretrieve the identification of each entity on the path from theenrichment(s) received from connection. When the discovery processcompletes as needed, the network element can inject enrichments intoclients' SSL connections to this server as has been described.

The above method is able to discover the presence of enrichment-capablenetwork elements in the path to the destination, even if the destinationserver itself is not enrichment capable.

There is no strict encryption requirement on enrichment data. In systemswhere the public Internet is used, however, security of enrichment datashould be implemented. For a server on the public Internet, enrichmentdata received typically cannot be trustworthy unless its source istrusted and the server is guaranteed not to have been tampered by anynetwork entity on the path after the data was sent. Preferably,enrichment data in such cases should be encrypted with a key known onlyto the two endpoints.

Device configuration is a simple method to provision common keys for anynetwork element and the server to which the device wants to sendenrichment information. Alternatively, for systems spanning multipleadministrative domains, the following design for key negotiation atruntime may be used. The server is assumed to provide apublicly-accessible secure URL that network elements can use tonegotiate keys. The discovery connection may be extended for thispurpose. In addition to asking the server or network elements toidentify themselves, the enrichment record in the discovery connectionthen also is used to request the server to reveal the details of itskey-negotiation mechanism (i.e. the above URL). Upon receiving the queryin the enrichment record, the server returns the URL in an enrichmentrecord sent to the network element on the same connection. Uponreceiving the secure URL, the network entity makes a separate request tothe URL, providing its own identification (e.g. a client-cert). Theserver then verifies the identity. If the server wants to acceptenrichments from the network entity, then it returns a key to the entityas part of the response. The network element is now able to createencrypted and/or signed enrichments for any connection going to theserver. The key can be re-negotiated as many times as required over thecourse of time following the same procedure. As noted in the previoussection, the method can discover enrichment-capable network elements inthe path to the destination server even if the server itself is notenrichment-capable. In such a scenario, the above-described can be usedfor the negotiation of keys for pairs of communicating network elements,not involving the server.

FIG. 9 further illustrates a preferred software layering approach ofthis disclosure and, in particular, how the enrichment layer 906 in themiddle-box 900 interoperates with the layers at each end of the SSLcommunication. In this embodiment, the client 902 is a mobile device(UE) connecting to an edge server HTTP proxy 904.

FIG. 10 illustrates various applications of SSL enrichment in mobilenetworks. In this embodiment, various network services are chained andmay interact with one another. In this representative, but non-limitingoperating scenario, an over-the-top (OTT) adaptive bitrate stream isdesired to be delivered from the edge server 1000 to a requesting mobiledevice (the user equipment (UE)) 1002. A middle-box 1004 is positionedbetween a radio access network element (e.g., an eNodeB application)1006 and the edge server 1000. The SSL enrichments described above are away to provide a two-way communication channel among the identifiedservices. For example, here the network communicates to the edge servervarious radio conditions (e.g., recommended BW limit), and the edgeserver informs the network of the chosen stream bandwidths. The edgeserver also informs the middle box and eNodeB application what TCPoptimization settings they should use in the EPC and on the radio. Theedge server informs the UE's OS platform of the stream bandwidth. Ofcourse, these are merely representative HTTPS request enrichments.

The above example depicts how the technique of this disclosure providesfor radio-aware SSL enrichment. The radio status information iscollected and then sent using SSL enrichment, as part of the SSLconnection, to an overlay network. By obtaining this information, theoverlay network can adapt and optimize the content for mobile deliveryin the CDN, thereby providing better mobile user experience, highernetwork utilization and lower network congestion.

The technique of this disclosure thus provides for providing theenrichment data by injecting an enrichment record into the SSLconnection, and for retrieval of the enrichment data by removing theenrichment record and sending the original record flow to the SSL layer.

The particular functionality of the middle box that implements thedescribed functionality is not intended to be limiting. Typically, andas described, the enrichment (e.g., throughput information) is added asdata packets are forwarded through the device.

FIG. 11 illustrates how the service discovery protocol 1100 (e.g.,operating in edge server 1102 in this example) and as described abovemay be used to discover enrichment-capable devices and other serviceAPIs, and to negotiate encryption keys.

As can be seen, the enrichment technique described above relies on SSLrecord type and version numbers to differentiate between, on the onehand, the original SSL records (written by the endpoints of theconnection), and, on the other hand, the enrichment records (inserted bya middle entity). This specific method of differentiation is notintended to be limiting.

References herein to SSL should not be considered limiting, as theapproach applies as well to Transport Layer Security (TLS) connections.Thus, for purposes herein, SSL and TLS are interchangeable.

Accordingly, and as depicted in FIG. 5, a new layer (namely, enrichmentlayer 504 in FIG. 5) between TCP and SSL or TLS is introduced. By virtueof this position in the protocol stack, the enrichment layer is able torecognize data flowing on SSL/TLS connections in either direction as asequence of structured SSL/TLS records. In one embodiment, a new type ofSSL/TLS record (also sometimes referred to herein as an AUX record) isthen provided for and exists at the layer for purposes of communicatingdata, preferably between network services and other servers (such asHTTP servers). As described above, preferably network services and theservers directly insert their data into the SSL/TLS connections in theform of AUX records, and retrieve them.

The enrichment layer in FIG. 5 may be implemented as a user-levellibrary, e.g., linked with an application at compile time. Thus,preferably the approach herein operates as an application-layermechanism, although this is not a limitation. As described above,preferably the enrichment layer provides an API for the application tosend or retrieve auxiliary data through the mechanism.

Preferably, AUX records are not inserted into a connection unless thesender is sure that they will not cause errors at their intendeddestination or at any intervening network element. In addition, theentity inserting data must know the format in which the destinationexpects it to arrive.

As a skilled person will appreciate, the mechanism described hereinprovides for in-band data communication for use with end-to-endencrypted traffic flows, but which does not interfere with encryption inany way. Preferably, the mechanism allows either endpoint of an SSL/TLSconnection or an intervening middle box to insert/retrieve/deleteauxiliary data into the TCP flow of the connection.

As an option, the data exchanged in the AUX record may itself beprotected by enabling the communicating entities to exchange the data inplaintext, signed plaintext, or encrypted with an auxiliary key.

Preferably, and because in a representative embodiment AUX records areessentially invalid SSL/TLS records, they are not allowed to reach theTLS layer at either endpoint of the TLS connection. To support AUXrecords at either endpoint, preferably the application at such endpointhas the record handling layer (e.g., enrichment layer 504 in FIG. 5)sandwiched between the TCP and SSL/TLS layers, as previously depictedand described. Preferably, the enrichment layer is responsible forhandling the AUX records, and keeping them from reaching the TLS layer.

The following provides additional details regarding a representativediscovery and negotiation protocol that may be implemented by themechanism. For descriptive purposes, the steps of the protocol arepresented in the context of an environment in which clients make HTTPSrequests to a server (S) on the internet, and the data flow passesthrough a network element in the middle (NE). The protocol describeswhat NE should do to initiate metadata communication with S. As usedbelow, the enrichment layer support is referred to as “TLS-AUX.”

Discovery Protocol

-   -   1. If S wants to send and/or receive metadata to/from NE, then        it should publicly advertise TLS-AUX support, e.g., through two        custom options in its SSL certificate.        -   The option TLS-AUX-Support may have the values of SEND,            RECEIVE or SENDRECEIVE, indicating whether the server is            interested in only sending metadata, only receiving            metadata, or both.        -   The option TLS-AUX-NegotiationURL may contain the URL where            any interested NE can negotiate the format of the metadata            and cryptographic keys to be used (if applicable) for the            payload of the AUX records.    -   2. If NE has the ability to observe traffic flow, then it may        discover all the server IPs that serve TLS traffic to clients        downstream from NE, as well as the domain names hosted by them,        from either the certificate or the SNI part of the handshake.        Further, NE may identify the subset of the servers that        advertise TLS-AUX support in their server certificates. For        TLSv1.2 or below, NE should do so by observing the server        certificates on the wire. For TLSv1.3 or higher, the        certificates sent by a server are encrypted, and thus cannot be        examined by NE. In this case, NE should explicitly initiate a        TLS handshake with SNI to S for each known domain name served by        the S. It should thus retrieve all the domains' certificates        from S, and examine them to discover which domains support        TLS-AUX. Business rules configured in NE may be used to further        short-list the servers that the NE should engage in TLS-AUX        communication with.

Negotiation Protocol

Once NE has decided to send and/or receive metadata to/from a server S,then NE should initiate the negotiation protocol. Preferably, theprotocol is run out-of-band from live user traffic.

-   -   1. All the protocol negotiations must happen over a TLS        connection that NE initiates to S. NE must insert a zero-length        TLS-AUX record into this connection after the TLS connection is        established, before any further communication. If the insertion        of this record gives rise to a TLS error, then NE must conclude        that either S or an invisible network element on the network        path to S does not support TLS-AUX. The protocol fails and NE        must not insert any TLS-AUX records into connections destined to        S.    -   2. If step 2 does not fail, then NE should make a POST request        to the negotiation URL provided in the server's certificate. In        the POST body, NE must include a request for the metadata schema        and encryption methods supported by the server.    -   3. Upon receiving the POST request body from NE, S must decide        if it wants to engage in metadata communication with the NE. To        decline, it must respond with an HTTP 403 (Forbidden) response.        If S decides to accept this request, it should create a new        TLS-AUX session for metadata exchange between NE and S. To        notify acceptance, it must respond with an HTTP status 200 (OK).        In the response body, S must provide a session-id, the types of        metadata that it is willing to send and/or receive, the crypto        algorithm, a key, and the expiration time of the key. The key is        for the encryption of the payload of TLS-AUX records exchanged        as part of the session. Both NE and S must associate the key        with the session. If S wants the payload of the TLS-AUX record        to be in plaintext, then the crypto algorithm should indicate        so, and the key would be irrelevant.    -   4. If NE's POST request indicated that it might want to receive        metadata from S, then S must include a zero-length TLS-AUX        record into this connection before the response is sent.    -   5. Upon receiving an HTTP 200 response, NE must identify the        subset of the server's metadata types that it wants to send        and/or receive. It then must make a second POST request to the        same URL, identifying the subset of interest in the send and        receive direction in the session.    -   6. Upon receiving the second POST, S must respond either with an        HTTP 200 (OK) to confirm or HTTP 403 (Forbidden) to deny, which        concludes the negotiation.

Upon the completion of the steps of the negotiation protocol, S and NEhave an established TLS-AUX session, with a common knowledge of thecrypto scheme, key and expiration time of the session. The sender of themetadata should use the key to encrypt or sign the metadata sent throughTLS-AUX records. The key cannot be used after the expiration date.TLS-AUX session may be re-negotiated by NE any time to get a valid key.

Internet routes are not stable and can change over time. This means thatany new incompatible network element may get introduced in the pathbetween NE and S within the lifetime of an existing TLS-AUX session,which can deny traffic till the end of the established session'slifetime. A renegotiation of the session after expiration would remedythe situation. It can be argued that network elements that examine TLSrecord structures may be present near the endpoints of the connection(e.g., services in the Gi-LAN of mobile networks or security appliancesin the datacenter where servers are hosted), rather than in the publicInternet paths. Therefore, path changes on the internet are far lesslikely to bring about this situation than a change of networkconfiguration near the endpoints. Because the networks and servers arewillful participants in TLS-AUX sessions, they can be expected to avoidthis situation through their operations processes.

Session Identification

As long as a valid TLS-AUX session exists between NE and S, they mayinsert/remove TLS-AUX records into users' data-flows. However, networkmiddle-boxes are often transparent or are located in private networkspace, which makes them invisible to S. As a result, when a user's TLSconnection arrives at S, it may not be possible for S to tell whichTLS-AUX session it may belong to, which is required to locate thedecryption key for deciphering the metadata contained in the TLS-AUXrecord, and knowing which metadata parameters have been negotiated forthat session. To help S identify the session, if NE intends to exchangemetadata with S for any TLS connection, then it should send a TLS-AUXrecord to S containing the session-id in the beginning of the TLSconnection establishment. S must not send any TLS-AUX records on anyconnection unless it is able to identify the TLS-AUX session to whichthe connection belongs.

Although the protocol is described above in the context of one NE andone S, it is extensible to an environment with multiple NEs along thepath between clients and S. In such an environment, each NE mustnegotiate its own TLS-AUX session with the server, and a TLS connectionbetween the client and the server may belong to multiple TLS-AUXsessions. The library description below assumes a single TLS-AUX sessionfor each connection. An extension to support multiple sessions isstraightforward.

The following provides additional details regarding implementation of aTLS-AUX library in one embodiment. As noted above, at any entity thatterminates a TLS connection, AUX records must be processed and removedbefore they can reach the TLS layer. The following is a method toimplement the library for reference. It is a user-level library to belinked with the application at compile time, with a few specificsystem-call wrapper options. In this embodiment, FIG. 13 depicts thesoftware layering arrangement. FIG. shows the library API that the AUXlayer provides to the application to send/retrieve metadata. To identifya connection's TLS-AUX session and to send/receive metadata on aconnection, the application should call the API functions and providethe file-descriptor of the TLS connection. Any responsibility ofhandling encryption or signing of the metadata in TLS-AUX recordspreferably lies with the library, and the application is expected towork with unencrypted metadata.

System Call Wrapping

TLS libraries such as OpenSSL are user-space libraries, and they use TCPsockets for network communication. It uses the standard system callssuch as open( ), close( ), read( ), readv( ), write( ), writev( ),listen( ), and accept( ) with underlying sockets. The TLS-AUX layerintercepts the calls between the TLS library and sockets by using themechanism of system call wrapping. The TLS-AUX library hijacks all theabove system calls, so that when the TLS library makes one of thesesystem calls, the corresponding function of the TLS-AUX layer getscalled. The layer can then invoke the original system call, in additionto performing additional actions, as described below.

Receiving Metadata

When the TLS layer calls read( ) to receive data from the network, theTLS-AUX layer's read wrapper function gets called. This function, inturn, invokes the original system call read( ) to receive data from thenetwork. The read( ) wrapper function then operates on the data receivedfrom the network, separates TLS-AUX records from the original TLSrecords. The metadata received from the TLS-AUX records on any TLSconnection is decrypted or stored in a memory table corresponding tothat connection. The leftover data is then passed on to the TLS layer aspart of the read( ) call. When the application calls the API functionssuch as get_tlsaux_item_count( ), read_tlsaux_item_size( ),read_tlsaux_item( ), etc., the TLS-AUX layer answers the calls using thetable that stores these items for each connection.

Sending Metadata

As mentioned previously, metadata may not be sent on a TLS connection,unless its TLS-AUX session(s) can be identified. When it is known, andthe application layer calls write_tlsaux_item( ), it is stored intoanother table that stores outgoing metadata for each file descriptor.When TLS layer makes a write( ) call on the connection, the TLS-AUXlayer's write wrapper function gets called. This function, in turn, isresponsible for writing TLS-AUX records into the connection, followed bythe original encrypted TLS records received as the argument of thewrite( ) function.

Handling Encryption of the AUX Frames Payload

Once the TLS-AUX session has been established by the application with anNE, it can set the session's encryption details in the library using thesetSessionDetails( ) function. The library can then use the encryptionmethod and key to decrypt metadata in the TLS-AUX messages, or to checksignatures for validity.

Applications of the described mechanism are many.

A typical use case is one in which a mobile network wants to sendmetadata to media servers (CDN and otherwise) located on the publicinternet, so that media delivery can be optimized.

Another use-case is one in which a mobile network sends metadata tomedia servers located on the public internet to optimize networkresource usage and deliver a better QoE to its subscribers.

Yet another use case is one in which a web server on the public internetwants to send metadata to a proxy located inside the private networkspace of a mobile network. Of course, these are just representativeexamples.

An alternative approach for insertion of enrichment is now described. Inthis method, the enrichment library on the middle-box and theconnection's two endpoints support an SSL record wrapping protocol. Thestructure of the record wrapper is shown in FIG. 12 by way of example.In one embodiment, the wrapper 1200 has two header fields (version andtype) and is meant to enclose an SSL record as its payload. The valuesof the header fields preferably identify if the wrapper contains an SSLrecord, or if it contains something different than an SSL record. Forinstance, wrapper type 0 could be used to indicate that the wrapper'spayload is an original SSL record, while wrapper type 1 could indicatethat the payload is enrichment information. These are merelyrepresentative type values.

The following describes how the participants (the middle-box or eitherendpoint of the connection) read and write enrichments in thisalternative technique. The writing enrichments scenario is describedfirst. In particular, at every participant in the relevant flow,preferably the enrichment library observes the flow of records on eachSSL connection. The records may be original SSL records, or they may bewrapped by another entity. If the records are not wrapped, preferablythe library wraps them as they pass through. Any enrichment data to beinserted into the connection is then inserted after the end of anywrapped SSL record. In this example, the enrichment data may be insertedas a payload of a wrapper with type 1. Reading enrichments can thenproceed as follows. At every participant, the enrichment libraryobserves the flow of records. The records may arrive as regular SSLrecords, or they may arrive as wrapped records. Based on wrapper typefields, the library identifies enrichment, and takes the relevantrecords out of the data flow. If the library happens to be located oneither endpoint, then it also preferably un-wraps the wrapped SSLrecords before passing them on to the SSL library.

More generally, the techniques described herein are provided using a setof one or more computing-related entities (systems, machines, processes,programs, libraries, functions, or the like) that together facilitate orprovide the described functionality described above. In a typicalimplementation, a representative machine on which the software executescomprises commodity hardware, an operating system, an applicationruntime environment, and a set of applications or processes andassociated data, that provide the functionality of a given system orsubsystem. As described, the functionality may be implemented in astandalone machine, or across a distributed set of machines. Thefunctionality may be provided as a service, e.g., as a SaaS solution.

While the above describes a particular order of operations performed bycertain embodiments of the invention, it should be understood that suchorder is exemplary, as alternative embodiments may perform theoperations in a different order, combine certain operations, overlapcertain operations, or the like. References in the specification to agiven embodiment indicate that the embodiment described may include aparticular feature, structure, or characteristic, but every embodimentmay not necessarily include the particular feature, structure, orcharacteristic.

While the disclosed subject matter has been described in the context ofa method or process, the subject disclosure also relates to apparatusfor performing the operations herein. This apparatus may be speciallyconstructed for the required purposes, or it may comprise ageneral-purpose computer selectively activated or reconfigured by acomputer program stored in the computer. Such a computer program may bestored in a computer readable storage medium, such as, but is notlimited to, any type of disk including an optical disk, a CD-ROM, and amagnetic-optical disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory(RAM), a magnetic or optical card, or any type of media suitable forstoring electronic instructions, and each coupled to a computer systembus. While given components of the system have been describedseparately, one of ordinary skill will appreciate that some of thefunctions may be combined or shared in given instructions, programsequences, code portions, and the like.

Preferably, the functionality is implemented in an application layersolution, although this is not a limitation, as portions of theidentified functions may be built into an operating system or the like.

The functionality may be implemented with other application layerprotocols besides HTTPS, such as SSL VPN, or any other protocol havingsimilar operating characteristics.

There is no limitation on the type of computing entity that mayimplement the client-side or server-side of the connection. Anycomputing entity (system, machine, device, program, process, utility, orthe like) may act as the client or the server.

What is claimed is as follows:
 1. A method operative in a computingentity positioned intermediate between first and second computingentities, the computing entity comprising a software stack comprising anSSL layer and an underlying socket layer, each of the first and secondcomputing entities operative to establish, between them, a SecureSockets Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS) communicationpath, wherein during an SSL/TLS data flow between the first and secondcomputing entities one or more SSL/TLS records are generated,comprising: configuring an enrichment handling layer between the SSLlayer and the underlying socket layer, wherein the enrichment handlinglayer as configured does not have access to a key that secures theSSL/TLS data flow; verifying, by the enrichment handling layer, that atleast one of the first and second computing entities are capable ofprocessing illegal SSL/TLS records, wherein an illegal SSL/TLS record isa SSL/TLS record that has an invalid record type value associatedtherewith; and upon the enrichment handling layer verifying that atleast one of the first and second computing entities is capable ofprocessing illegal SSL/TLS records, and without modifying the existingSSL layer or having access to content secured by the SSL/TLS data flow,injecting into or removing from the SSL/TLS data flow enrichmentinformation, the enrichment information associated with an illegalSSL/TLS record.
 2. The method as described in claim 1, wherein theenrichment information is enrichment data describing a network status orcharacteristic, or a device status or characteristic.
 3. The method asdescribed in claim 1, wherein the illegal SSL/TLS record has an invalidrecord type value to designate the SSL/TLS record as being associatedwith the enrichment information.
 4. The method as described in claim 1,wherein the SSL/TLS record has associated therewith a wrapper layer, thewrapper layer including given data to designate the SSL/TLS record asbeing associated with the enrichment information.
 5. The method asdescribed in claim 1, wherein the SSL/TLS record includes the enrichmentinformation.
 6. The method as described in claim 1, wherein the SSL/TLSrecord is the enrichment information.
 7. The method as described inclaim 1, further including terminating a TCP connection at theenrichment handling layer.
 8. The method as described in claim 1,wherein the first computing entity is a mobile device and the secondcomputing entity is an edge server of an overlay network.
 9. The methodas described in claim 1, wherein injecting the enrichment informationcomprises ordered steps of: intercepting a system call between the SSLlayer and the underlying socket layer and, in response, calling acorresponding wrapper function; and invoking, by the correspondingwrapper function, the system call.
 10. The method as described in claim9, wherein the system call is a write system call.
 11. The method asdescribed in claim 10, wherein the invoking step sends data to a givenone of the first and second computing entities, writes and outputs atleast one SSL/TLS data record, and then outputs to the socket layer theenrichment data.
 12. The method as described in claim 9, wherein thesystem call is a read system call.
 13. The method as described in claim12, wherein the invoking step removes from a received SSL/TLS record theenrichment information, and then outputs to the socket layer anyremaining data.
 14. The method as described in claim 1, furtherincluding the enrichment handling layer initiating a discovery protocolto determine whether a given entity along the SSL/TLS data flow iscapable of processing the enrichment information associated with theSSL/TLS record.
 15. An apparatus positioned intermediate between firstand second computing entities, each of the first and second computingentities operative to establish, between them, a Secure Sockets Layer(SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS) communication path, whereinduring an SSL/TLS data flow between the first and second computingentities one or more SSL/TLS records are generated, the apparatuscomprising: a processor; computer memory supporting a software stack,the software stack comprising at least an SSL layer, an underlyingsocket layer, and an enrichment handling layer positioned between theSSL layer and the underlying socket layer, wherein the enrichmenthandling layer does not have access to a key that secures the SSL/TLSdata flow; wherein the enrichment handling layer is configured to verifythat at least one of the first and second computing entities is capableof processing illegal SSL/TLS records, wherein an illegal SSL/TLS recordis a SSL/TLS record that has an invalid record type value associatedtherewith; wherein upon the enrichment handling layer verifying that atleast one of the first and second computing entities is capable ofprocessing illegal SSL/TLS records, the enrichment handling layer isfurther configured to terminate TCP connections and, without modifyingthe existing SSL layer or having access to content secured by theSSL/TLS data flow, to inject into or remove from the SSL/TLS data flowenrichment information, the enrichment information associated with anillegal SSL/TLS record.
 16. The apparatus as described in claim 15,wherein the enrichment information is enrichment data describing anetwork status or characteristic, or a device status or characteristic.17. The apparatus as described in claim 15, wherein the illegal SSL/TLSrecord has an invalid record type value to designate the SSL/TLS recordas being associated with the enrichment information.
 18. The apparatusas described in claim 15, wherein the SSL/TLS record has associatedtherewith a wrapper, the wrapper including given data to designate theSSL/TLS record as being associated with the enrichment information. 19.The apparatus as described in claim 15, wherein the enrichment handlinglayer injects or removes the enrichment information by: intercepting asystem call between the SSL layer and the underlying socket layer and,in response, calling a corresponding wrapper function; and invoking, bythe corresponding wrapper function, the system call.
 20. The apparatusas described in claim 19, wherein the system call is one of: a writesystem call, and a read system call, the write system call writing theenrichment information into the SSL/TLS data flow, the read system callreading the enrichment information from the SSL/TLS data flow.